
The election of Barack Obama has been across the globe, particularly in Europe, a huge hope, to find a more open to the world and America to regain its ability to historic leadership at a particular time critical. This appropriation global and immediate outcome of the polls in the United States, for understandable and sympathetic to it, should not blind us: the victory of the young black Senator from Illinois is first that of American democracy, both the culmination of historical battles and result of demographic and sociological of long-term developments. It is first and foremost a moving and important American case, including the first consequence is to strengthen political and moral of the United States themselves. If one adds to this reality the severity of the economic and financial crisis that rocked the greatest power on Earth, it will be understood that the agenda of the Obama administration (which will be really operational than current 2009) will first be national.
This does not mean that the new team in power in Washington is not more open to Europe. But Americans best prepared to see in it the privileged partner United States are also the most demanding in its regard, particularly when it comes to participation in the American military effort for the defence of common strategic interests: diplomatic advisers of the elected President are exactly on this line. If these expectations are not met, the transatlantic relationship will remain much more cordial than under the first Bush term, but it will give priority to other concerns and alliances. Beyond the transatlantic warming began as early as the second term Bush, 2008 Europe presents itself with a non-negligible credit. The Sarkozy-Brown-Merkel trio is much more attractive, coherent and constructive that the Chirac-Schröder-Putin in 2002-2003 front, and the European Union under French Presidency has shown true leadership capacity, both in conflict spilled the summer spent in the international financial crisis.

But this not be enough, an America morally strengthened by his historic vote, and especially about the accumulation of the folders that is difficult and potentially conflicting between the two shores of the Atlantic and within the Union: Afghanistan and Pakistan, the priority of Barack Obama; Iran, whose nuclear program continues; Russia, with the issues of enlargement of NATO and the missile defense, not to mention the Iraq, the Middle East and major multilateral subjects. All these issues, except perhaps that of climate change, the continuity should dominate in Washington after January 20, 2009. Positive in principle, the recent European initiative to propose to the elected President a "partnership of equals" with the United States would have earned to take advantage of the transitional phase to develop a real substance on some of these files.
The worsening of the economic crisis also threatens European cohesion. Institutionally, the remarkable performance of the Union through seizures geopolitical and financial of the second half of 2008 is largely the result of a happy accident: the rotating Presidency of a large Member State, and even more voluntarism, leadership and ability in the management of crisis of Nicolas Sarkozy. Without this welcome coincidence, have the European Commission and the President of the Eurogroup played a larger role That will be tomorrow A Board of Directors of the larger States may prevail through the crisis, weakening the common institutions, with the exception of strong, Central Bank independence and its now undisputed usefulness. Most importantly, the divergent implementation in the European Union of the "Toolbox" anticrise there is a real risk of fragmentation of the single market and laxity of the solidarity and the common disciplines.
The new State of the world and puts Europe under pressure (geopolitical, economic, institutional,...) as it opens a window of opportunity to increase its influence on the international scene. The chance of the European calendar of the second half of 2008 is the best argument for a Presidency of the Union, under a treaty that holds hostage the absurd combination of the requirement of unanimity to 27 and the tolerance of national referendums and stable. Moreover, the vulnerability of the European economy to external shocks reinforces the need to go beyond the bureaucratic gangue of the "Lisbon agenda" for the benefit of a real European strategy for globalisation, refocused on the deepening of the single market and with a strong external dimension in community dominant. The subject will soon be on the agenda of the twenty-seven. If it manages to fix the cap on these two priority lands the Treaty and the strategy for globalization , the French Presidency which will culminate soon will be well-deserved of Europe.